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Abstract
This paper argues that human geography’s scale debate has arrived at somewhat of an impasse surrounding
scale’s relative position to ontology. Divides are most evident between those that see scales as ‘already
existing’ and those considering this as a form of ‘ontological reification’ that stifles our understanding of
politics. I suggest that reading the ‘politics of scale’ through Jacques Rancière’s political thinking, and in
particular his aesthetic approach to the problem of ontological reductionism, can offer one way forward. It
enables geographers to take existing ‘common-sense’ ideas around scale seriously whilst also being sensitive
to emergent politics.
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Hierarchical scale carries with it presuppositions
that can delimit entry points into politics – and the
openness of the political – by pre-assigning to it a
cordoned register for resistance. (Marston et al.,
2005: 427)
I Introduction
The ‘politics of scale’ is a term coined by Neil
Smith (2010 [1984]: 229) to attend to the pro-
cesses through which scales are constructed and
contested. But the concept is steeped in com-
plexity and has been subject to extensive disci-
plinary debate. The late 1990s and early 2000s
saw a deluge of literature debating ‘the nature of
scale’: what it is, is not, and how it ought to be
deployed (Brenner, 2001; Jones, 1998; Kaiser
and Nikiforova, 2008: 538; Marston, 2000;
Marston et al., 2005). By the mid-2000s scale
was increasingly seen as a ‘chaotic conception’
(Howitt, 2003), even prompting discussions of
its disciplinary expulsion (Marston et al., 2005).
human geography’s scale debate had arrived at
an impasse. Divisions took hold around scale’s
relationship with ontology and the political con-
sequences of our conceptions. Separately, and
more recently, disciplinary debates surrounding
‘politics’, ‘the political’ and how they relate to
ontology have also deepened (Barnett, 2017;
Dikeç, 2005, 2012a, 2012b; Featherstone and
Korf, 2012; Meyer et al., 2012; Swyngedouw,
2009, 2010, 2013). But herein, I suggest, lies an
opportunity. This paper develops the thought of
Jacques Rancière, a key thinker infusing recent
debates on the political, to offer one way for-
ward for human geography’s scale debate and
its divides around politics and ontology.
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Both the idea of scale as socially-constructed
and ‘the rejection of scale as an ontologically
given category’ (Marston, 2000: 220) are widely
accepted within human geography. However,
questions of when we are ontologizing scale and
what our conceptions mean for politics are far
from settled (Castree et al., 2008). In the subse-
quent section, for instance, I will outline how
some claim scales predate social activity, such
that it is necessary to take stock of already-
existing scales when considering politics. Others,
however, claim this to be a form of ‘ontological
reification’ that instead stifles political possibili-
ties. The extremes of this latter group are exem-
plified by Marston et al.’s (2005) proposed
wholesale eradication of scale from the disci-
pline. Our treatment of scale in relation to ontol-
ogy and politics clearly matters yet, as Chapura
has argued, a ‘need remains for a detailed and
coherent theoretical framework for thinking
about scale ontologically’ (2009: 463).
Such a task is pertinent given the current
‘ontological turn’ in political thought, where
theorists have inquired into the ontological
assumptions that shape political thinking
(Marchart, 2018). Whilst I argue that there can
be no panacea for the divides of the scale debate,
I suggest that reading the ‘politics of scale’
through the political and aesthetic thinking of
Jacques Rancière can move us beyond the pres-
ent theoretical impasse on scale’s relative posi-
tion to ontology. Rancière is of increasing
interest to human geographers (cf. Cook,
2018; Derickson, 2017; Dikeç, 2005, 2012a,
2012b; Dixon, 2009; Ruez, 2013; Wilson and
Swyngedouw, 2014; Tolia-Kelly, 2017). Whilst
for many Rancière’s thought is useful in consid-
ering the ‘post-political’ nature of the contem-
porary governance (for example Swyngedouw,
2009), what draws me to him here is his
approach to political change more broadly
(Davidson and Iveson, 2014). In particular, it
is his ‘aesthetic’ solution to the problem of onto-
logical reductionism (a concern many scale the-
orists share) that I argue warrants attention.
Aesthetics means myriad things to geogra-
phers (Hawkins and Straughan, 2014, but for
Rancière (2006: 13) it relates to ‘forms of per-
ceiving the world and modes of relating to it’
(Dikeç, 2012a: 274). Rancière (2009c: 56) sug-
gests we are bound together by a ‘sensory fab-
ric’ that shapes how we make sense of the
world. He terms this le partage du sensible (the
distribution of the sensible). Politics, in turn,
disrupts these normalized ways of making sense
and transforms them (Rancière, 1999). This aes-
thetic approach to politics, as we shall see,
allows us to consider how social activity is
shaped by inherited, shared, ‘common-sense’
whilst avoiding ontological theorizing and nar-
rowing political possibilities. In adopting Ran-
cière’s approach I argue that scales serve as one
such ‘common-sense’ frame which shapes
places and roles played in society. Whilst, in
such a reading, scales do precede social activity,
there is nothing ‘natural’ or ontologically-given
about them. As such, they can always be dis-
rupted by politics.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the second
section, human geography’s scale debate is
overviewed, highlighting how thinkers under-
stand scale in relation to ontology. In the third
section I introduce Rancière’s political thought
and his approach to avoiding ontologizing polit-
ical thinking. I utilize this understanding to
reconsider the ontological disagreements of the
scale debate, offering his aesthetic solution as
one possible way forward. In the fourth section,
drawing upon examples, I consider the implica-
tions of Rancière’s aesthetic approach for the
politics of scale. I suggest the approach is able
to bring together idealist approaches which
understand scale as ‘mental contrivances for
[ . . . ] ordering processes and practices’ (Herod,
2011: 13) and materialist understandings which
consider scale as produced through political
struggle. Moreover, in keeping scales and the
opportunity for their contestation in parallax
view, a Rancièrian approach can more fully
account for scale as a ‘product and a
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progenitor’ of social activity (MacKinnon,
2010: 22). Finally, I conclude by suggesting that
whilst we do not encounter scales ‘“up there” in
a vertical imaginary but on the ground, in prac-
tice’, this is not to say that these shared, vertical
imaginaries do not matter (Marston et al., 2005:
420). Rather, what is vital for scale theorists to
consider is how common-sense on scales as ver-
tical imaginaries is met with dissensus ‘on the
ground’ (Rancière, 2016a: 159).
II Geography and scale: An
ontological dispute
1 Towards a ‘politics’ of scale
Prior to the 1980s, ‘scale’ was largely taken
for granted as a way of establishing hierarchy
and order over space (Herod, 2011). These
early theorizations drew on Kant’s (2007
[1781]) understanding of time and space as a
priori forms that shape how we make sense of
the world. Under Kant’s idealist approach, time
and space were hard-wired in the mind (Dikeç,
2012a; Dixon et al., 2012). Scale, then, was seen
as part of this mental spatiotemporal ordering
system. However, following the materialist
interventions of Peter Taylor (1982) and Neil
Smith (2010 [1984]), the concept was hotly
debated. As this debate is well documented
(cf. Herod, 2011; Jonas, 2015; MacKinnon,
2010; Marston et al., 2005), I trace only the key
contours here.
Taylor (1982), drawing upon Immanuel Wal-
lerstein’s world systems theory, theorized the
scales of the urban, the nation and the global,
tracing their emergence under capitalism. Tay-
lor’s work is broadly seen as critical human
geography’s foundational piece on scale (Mar-
ston et al., 2005; Smith, 2008). However, it is
Smith who is credited with ‘profoundly
revolutioni[sing . . . ] scholarly understandings
of space through his conceptualization of scale’
(Jones et al., 2017: 138–9).
In Uneven Development: Nature, Capital,
and the Production of Space, Smith (2010
[1984]) identified the urban, national and global
as scales where uneven development can be
observed. Smith derives these scales from capi-
tal’s contradicting tendency to spatially ‘differ-
entiate’ and ‘equalize’ (see Smith, 2010 [1984]:
chs. 4 & 5). Despite the impossibility of achiev-
ing permanent spatial fixity against these con-
tradictory tendencies (Harvey, 1981, 1982), for
Smith, scales offer a degree. Smith (2010
[1984]: 180) considers uneven development
under capitalism not as a mosaic of spaces but
as organized by this multi-scale system. These
scales are ‘nested rather than hierarchical’
(Smith, 1992a: 66) and produced rather than
given, with Smith considering their origins,
ends and ‘inner coherence’ as a window upon
the uneven development of capital (Smith, 2010
[1984]: 181). This processual approach
prompted Marxist political economy to investi-
gate how scales are shaped, considering their
production and how their ‘relative importance
may vary over space and time’ (Sheppard and
McMaster, 2008: 15).
Smith continued to work on the relation
between scale and capital (e.g. Smith, 1992b),
but recognized that these early theorizations,
derived to explain uneven development under
capitalism, were somewhat ‘wooden’ (Smith,
2011: 262). As such, Smith (2010 [1984]: 229)
introduced the ‘politics of scale’ in the After-
word to the second edition of Uneven Develop-
ment. The term was subsequently taken up by
numerous scholars to capture how actors
attempt the social construction of scale (Bren-
ner, 2001; Jones et al., 2017, Kaiser and Niki-
forova, 2008). The politics of scale attempts to
capture the interplay of prevailing power
mechanisms and political struggle, where scales
serve not only as a mechanism of ‘constraint and
exclusion’ but also ‘a weapon of expansion and
inclusion’ (1992: 61, 78). In Smith’s work on
resistance to gentrification in New York City,
for instance, he details how the homeless com-
munity of Tompkins Square Park was threat-
ened with a curfew to ‘take back’ the park
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(Smith, 2010 [1984]: 230–1). Under the banner
of ‘Tompkins Square Everywhere’, solidarity
squats emerged across the entire Lower East
Side. For Smith (2010 [1984]), this evidenced
how actors attempted to ‘jump scale’ to ‘elevate
themselves to the next scale up the hierarchy’
(2010: 232). For those adopting the politics of
scale, such struggles are precisely the political
component of the politics of scale (Newstead
et al., 2005: 486). The politics of scale was sub-
sequently adopted by an array of other geogra-
phers to interpret a plethora of struggles (cf.
Agnew, 1997; Herod, 1997; Jonas, 1994; Leit-
ner, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1996, 1997).
The politics of scale literature has focused on
‘the nature of scale’ – what scale is, what it is
not, and how the processes of rescaling take
place (Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008: 538). Scho-
lars have sought to understand the social, polit-
ical, cultural and economic processes through
which scales are redefined (Brenner, 1998;
MacKinnon, 2010; Smith, 1993; Swyngedouw,
1997). These processes have included the afore-
mentioned scale jumping; scale bending, where
‘entrenched assumptions about what kinds of
social activities fit properly at which scales are
[ . . . ] challenged and upset’ (Smith, 2008: 193);
and glocalization, ‘the contested restructuring
of the institutional level from the national scale’
both upwards and downwards (Swyngedouw,
2004: 37).
Marston notes that much of the 1990s politics
of scale literature focused on the role of ‘capital,
labor or the state – or some combination’ (2000:
221). One example given here is Brenner’s
(1997) work on post-war planning policies in the
Federal Republic of Germany between 1960 and
1990, where he considers how scales were
altered under changing configurations of both the
state and capital. Marston argues that whilst the
role of the state and capital are vital to consider,
the politics of scale had become overly:
[p]reoccupied with questions of capitalist produc-
tion [ . . . and fails] to comprehend the real
complexity behind the social construction of scale
and therefore tells only part of a much more com-
plex story. (Marston, 2000: 233)
In particular, Marston (2000) draws attention
to the role of patriarchal gender relations in the
politics of scale. Marston stakes a claim for a
more multifaceted understanding of the social
construction of scale that is sensitive not only to
capitalist production but also processes of social
reproduction and consumption.
Scholars have also debated the ‘vertical’ and
‘horizontal’ dimensions of scale. Brenner, for
instance, developed the concept of ‘scale struc-
turation’, to emphasize the links between scales
and the (re)hierarchization across the ‘vertically
differentiated spatial units’ (1998: 603). Some
have viewed this vertical dimension as too rigid,
turning to networked, horizontal and relational
understandings of social processes (see for
instance Cox, 1998b; Dicken, 2004), whilst oth-
ers have brought horizontal and vertical
approaches together (Amin, 2002; Brenner,
1998; Leitner, 2004; Taylor, 2004). Brenner has
since argued that scales do not just exist in ver-
tical or horizontal dimensions, but in both, advo-
cating a relational understanding ‘in terms of
upwards, downwards and sidewards links to
other geographical scales situated within tangled
hierarchies and dispersed interscalar networks’
(Brenner, 2001: 605). However, as Herod and
Wright (2008) have argued, perhaps the most
central debate has concerned the ontological sta-
tus of scale, to which I now turn.
2 Scale: Ontological, epistemological, non-
sensical?
If scale is continually contested [ . . . and] a repre-
sentational practice deployed by participants in
struggles [ . . . ] then what is its ontological status?
(Jones, 1998: 27)
In 1998 Katherine Jones asserted that scale was
a ‘representational trope’ which, in framing
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what is knowable, holds the power to ‘shape the
meaning of space’ (Jones, 1998: 27). Scale as a
mode of representation, therefore, was to be
understood as a technology of power which con-
figures what is knowable or true (Cox, 1998a:
43). For Jones (1998), this necessitated a recon-
sideration of whether scale was epistemological
– a way of thinking about the world – or whether
it is ontological – a fundamental ‘given’ of the
world. Reflecting that scales ‘as a mode of
understanding’ did not exist prior to becoming
a trope for making sense of space, Jones (1998:
28) argued that scales were epistemological. For
Jones (1998), when we assume scales to be
ontological we naturalize them and, in doing
so, diminish our analytical capacity to under-
stand how scales are used to frame and represent
space. This intervention was to be highly influ-
ential. As Marston (2000: 220) later noted,
interest in scale was gravitating toward con-
structionist frameworks and ‘the rejection of
scale as an ontologically given category’. But
in proffering this understanding, Jones (1998)
also laid the ground for a later series of debates
around not only how we can avoid reifying scale
in ontology, but also who is doing so.
Inspired by this turn to conceiving scales ‘not
as ontologically given, but as epistemology’,
scholars began conceptualizing scale as a dis-
cursive or representational device (Ansell,
2008; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Jones, 1998;
Kurtz, 2003: 893; Mansfield, 2005; Moore,
2008). These perspectives tended to treat scalar
frames as ‘unfolding’ and ‘[a]lways emergent’
narratives that delimit ‘sociospatial boundaries
and relations’ (Moore, 2008: 206, 221), often
taking the form of horizontal, actor-network
based understandings (Bulkeley, 2005; Col-
linge, 2006; Leitner et al., 2002; Marston
et al., 2005). Scalar narratives have been seen
as ‘a way of framing political-spatiality that in
turn has material effects’ (Jones, 1998: 27;
Moore, 2008). Kurtz (2003), for instance, has
observed how scale frames operate as a strategic
device for representing a controversy and,
conversely, how counter-scale frames might
seek to undermine these. These practice-
focused approaches began to reject perspectives
that saw scales as preceding social activity as
giving a problematic ‘ontological priority to
scales themselves’ (Herod, 2001: 46; Herod and
Wright, 2002). Others have been more sympa-
thetic toward ‘inherited scales’, with performa-
tivity approaches considering how scale is
utilized as a tactic of governmentality, as ‘a
naturalized way of seeing the world’, observing
both ‘the enacted discourses that over time work
to produce ‘scale effects’ and ‘the “gaps and
fissures” that destabilise these scalar epistemol-
ogies’ (Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008: 543).
Whilst scale’s role as an epistemological
construct had gained traction, this too was to
be disputed in Marston, Jones and Woodward’s
(2005) ‘Human Geography without Scale’. The
authors observed vast divergences in definitions
of scale, declaring it a more than ‘chaotic’ con-
cept (Marston et al., 2005). Central to this claim
was the supposed dichotomy between the domi-
nant perspective of scale as a ‘nested hierarchy
of differentially sized and bounded spaces’
(Marston et al., 2005: 416–17) and those who,
inspired by Latour and Deleuze amongst others
(Jones et al., 2007), stand in opposition to this
‘vertical’ understanding, comprehending scale
through a horizontal networked model (Jones
et al., 2007).
The authors argue that neither is sufficient,
asserting that ‘horizontal’ conceptions of scale
rely on an ontological ‘origin-to-edge imagin-
ary’, much as ‘vertical’ understandings rely on
the ‘local-to-global continuum’ (Marston
et al., 2005: 422). For Marston et al. (2005:
422), this merely replaces ‘one ontological-
epistemological nexus (verticality) with
another (horizontality)’. As such, they claim
critical geography should be able to decon-
struct these representational tropes without
ontologizing scale. Most research, they argue,
a priori assumes commonly-held ‘levels of
scale’ (such as the body, the national, the
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global), reflecting ‘the contingency of socially
constructed political boundaries’ rather than
socio-spatial processes (Marston et al., 2005:
422). In doing so, they argue that ‘the global’ is
seen as a more causal force, neutralizing the
agency of the local. Marston et al. (2005) also
reject an emergent third option, to hybridize
understandings of scale across both vertical
and horizontal dimensions (Brenner, 1998),
stating that the ‘inherent’, ‘foundational weak-
nesses’ of vertical approaches cannot be
resolved by ‘integrating them with network
formulations’ (Marston et al., 2005: 422,
417). Marston et al. conclude that a spatial
ontology that includes scale ‘delimit[s] entry
points into politics – and the openness of the
political – by pre-assigning to it a cordoned
register for resistance’ (2005: 427).
Instead, they suggest doing away with onto-
logical ‘predetermination’ completely, propos-
ing a ‘flat’, site-based ontology (Marston et al.,
2005: 422). This approach flattens both space
and scale into diverse sites of relations, prac-
tices and processes situated in place, folded into
an interconnected ‘neighbourhood’ of other
practices (Jonas, 2006). In doing so, they argue
that we can account ‘for socio-spatiality as it
occurs’ without imposing predetermined cate-
gories such as scale (Marston et al., 2005:
425). The proposed eradication of scale has had
a mixed reception. Some have received it posi-
tively (cf. Collinge, 2006; Springer, 2014; Esco-
bar, 2007), with Springer (2014: 408)
concurring that
scale [ . . . ] represents a theoretical distraction, a
drawing away from the grounder particularities of
the everyday [ . . . where we] soar off into an
abstract sky, only to touch down on the immediate
materiality of everyday life when and where it
becomes convenient to our argument.
Springer (2014: 408) welcomes the advance-
ment of a flat ontology with a ‘rhizomic notion
of a processual politics that is conceived
through actual practice’ but stops short of
recommending its complete abandonment.
Similarly, Escobar (2007) applauds the shift
towards ‘flat’ thinking, but argues that whether
this necessitates an abandonment or even over-
haul of scale is still a matter of debate.
On the other hand, Leitner and Miller (2007)
and Jonas (2006) contest that verticality need
not imply top-down hierarchical power rela-
tions, instead suggesting power may emerge
from the bottom-up, or in both directions simul-
taneously (Collinge, 1999; Sayre, 2005). Others
have defended ‘pre-existing’ scales in the name
of understanding and contesting power. Leitner
and Miller (2007), for instance, have argued that
recognizing already-existing scalar structures
does not diminish the opportunity for politics.
Rather, they suggest it is vital to developing
strategies of resistance. Whilst in agreement
that scale is not an ontological category of space
(Jones et al., 2017), Smith argues that the
attempt to replace contingent understandings
of scale, which he sees as organizing social dif-
ference, with horizontal understandings of
space abolishes power distinctions in an act of
‘wishful thinking’ (2015: 964). It is for this rea-
son that the wholesale excision of scale from
Geography has been argued to reinforce
unequal scalar power relations (Kaiser and
Nikiforova, 2008).
Despite these divides, attempts at reunifica-
tion have been made. Moore (2008: 214) has
argued that we should abandon scale as an ana-
lytical category to avoid ontological theorizing,
and instead consider how ideas about scalar
orders become solidified ‘in consciousness and
practice’. MacKinnon (2010), drawing upon a
critical realist perspective, has viewed the
charge of ontological reification held against
many political-economic understandings of the
politics of scale as too readily accepted. Instead,
MacKinnon (2010) argues that scales exist as a
consequence of both capitalist restructuring and
social practice in an attempt to create common
ground. In doing so, he argues that ‘the so-called
politics of scale are not fundamentally “of”
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(about) scale’ (2010: 32), but rather scale’s
deployment towards various ends. MacKinnon
advocates ‘scalar politics’ as a term to capture
this, as ‘an “open” political-economy approach
[ . . . ] receptive to poststructural insights con-
cerning the importance of scalar practices and
narratives’ (2010: 32) which recognizes ‘scalar
structures’ as both inherited and contested
(2010: 33). For MacKinnon (2010: 30), this
necessitates an understanding of how actors
attempt to ‘ontologically “fix” or “undo” scales
as material expressions of emergent power
relations’.
Subsequent to Jones’ (1998) intervention, it is
clear that the question of how scale ought to
relate to ontology became central to the scale
debate. Compare, for instance, Smith’s insistence
that, in asserting the existence of scales preced-
ing social activity, he was ‘in no way proposing
some ontological system of scales’ (1992b: 66;
Jones et al., 2017), with others charging this as
ontological reification (cf. Herod, 2001: 45–6;
Herod and Wright, 2002: 10–11; Jones, 1998;
Moore, 2008). Commentators have also insisted
that one’s position on scale’s ontological status
has ramifications for politics, though scale theor-
ists refer to highly divergent things in their use of
the term (Castree et al., 2008). Take, for instance,
Marston et al.’s (2005) assertion that a ‘flat’
ontology is more politically ‘open’ and Leitner
and Miller’s (2007) contrary position, that a rec-
ognition of pre-existing scales is instead crucial
to politics. The subsequent section suggests one
way to move beyond these ontological and polit-
ical divides.
III Reframing scale with Rancière
1 Police, politics and ontological principles
This section demonstrates how reading scale
through Jacques Rancière’s ‘post-foundational’
political framework offers one way forward.
Indeed, I turn to Rancière precisely because of
his treatment of ontology in relation to politics,
which I shall briefly outline.
In Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy,
Rancière (1999) argues that the traditional pur-
suit of philosophy has been to decide what is and
is not ontological. In a radical step, Rancière
instead proclaims that he is ‘not a political phi-
losopher’ (2003: np) and so abstains from theo-
rizing an ‘ontological principle of politics’
(2009a: 119). In posing the question of ‘[i]s
there any such thing as political philosophy?’,
Rancière (1999: vii) launches a scathing critique
of political philosophy as a paradoxical enter-
prise. For Rancière, in theorizing what a politi-
cal process is we impose rigid ontological
boundaries on the world that paradoxically cir-
cumscribe politics, supplanting ‘the anarchic
disorder of politics with [ . . . the] hierarchical
order of the philosopher’ (Chambers, 2011:
305). Under this understanding, political philo-
sophy is seen as
an attempt to suspend the destabilizing potential
of the political, to disavow and/or regulate it in
one way or another [ . . . ] fixing the rules of polit-
ical competition. (Žižek, 2006: 72)
Rancière’s apprehensions about how we con-
sider politics echoes Marston et al.’s (2005:
427) concern that scale theorizing limits ‘the
openness of the political’. However, Rancière
diverges from Marston et al. (2005) in that he
does not refute the value of understand pre-
existing yet contestable ways of managing and
making sense of the world including, I will
argue, scale.
It is Rancière’s twin appreciation for the lack
of any ontological principle for how society
ought to be ordered and the contingent ways in
which it is that has led Marchart (2007) to group
him amongst what he terms as ‘post-founda-
tional’ political theorists. Marchart (2007) argues
that we can distinguish post-foundational politi-
cal thinkers in their common rejection of ‘foun-
dationalist’ perspectives which claim that there is
a ‘natural’ or ontological principle for how we
might best organize society. They can also be
distinguished from anti-foundationalists who
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reject the existence of all ‘foundations’, consid-
ering them a barrier to thinking and enacting
emancipatory politics (Wingenback, 2011).
Instead, post-foundational thinkers assert that
whilst there is no ontological principle for how
we ought to order society, it is nonetheless valu-
able to consider socially constructed ‘founda-
tions’ as necessary, contingent and contestable
attempts to order society, space and time (Arditi,
2019; Marchart, 2007; Sparke, 2005; Wingen-
back, 2011).
A diverse set of these post-foundational polit-
ical thinkers has gained traction amongst geo-
graphers in the past decade, including Schmitt,
Ricœur, Wolin, Mouffe, Nancy, Badiou, Žižek
and Rancière (Marchart, 2007; Wilson and
Swyngedouw, 2014). However, in Rancière’s
work this translates into a distinct political lex-
icon. For Rancière politics is a ‘deviation from
[ . . . the] normal order of things’ (2001: 18).
This order of things, in turn, is what Rancière
calls the police order, which is not to be con-
fused with the police force. The police refers to
the broader ordering of parts and roles in a
community as ‘the seemingly natural order of
things’ (Dikeç, 2005: 174). Drawing upon a
Kantian understanding of aesthetics as that
which relates to sense-perception (Kant, 1999
[1790]), Rancière argues that the police order
has a corresponding aesthetic configuration
which normalizes certain ways of seeing, sen-
sing, feeling, acting, speaking and being in the
world. He terms this aesthetic configuration le
partage du sensible (which translates as both
the partition and sharing of the sensible)
(Dikeç, 2012a). This distribution of the sensi-
ble – as I shall henceforth term it – refers to a
shared:
system of self-evident facts of sense perception
that simultaneously discloses the existence of
something in common and the delimitations that
define the respective parts and positions within it
[ . . . ] a distribution of spaces, times, and form of
activity. (Rancière, 2006: 12)
As will become apparent, it is this aesthetic
approach which has led me to Rancière’s
work over other post-foundational political
thinkers.
Distinct from Kant’s idealist understanding
of space and time which influenced early con-
ceptions of scale in the discipline, the distribu-
tion of the sensible refers to framings of time
and space that arise in particular historical and
geographical contexts (Dikeç, 2013). The
police, therefore, can be understood as an
incumbent governance order that is symbolic
with material manifestations (Dikeç, 2012b;
Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017). As Dikeç
(2013: 82) observes, two premises structure
Rancière’s political thinking: ‘radical contin-
gency and radical equality’. Politics is always
a possibility precisely because there is no ‘nat-
ural’, ideal or ontologically-given way to order
society, even though the police order might
appear all inclusive or natural (see Rancière,
2000: 124). Acts of politics occur, therefore,
when the police order is disrupted by those that
declare it ‘wrong’ and a redistribution of the
sensible takes place (Dikeç, 2005; Rancière,
1999). As Rancière (1999: 30) argues, politics
‘undoes the perceptible divisions of the police’.
For this to occur ‘a polemical common space’
must be set up, where the established way of
ordering things (the police) is challenged by a
different logic in the name of equality (Dikeç,
2005: 178). This manifests as a dissensus, ‘the
presence of two worlds in one’, between the
police distribution of the sensible and the logic
of politics (Rancière, 2001: np). Equality, here,
is not an end to be strived for but is instead a
presupposition: politics is a verification of
equality (Dikeç, 2012a; Rancière, 1999). It is a
confrontation between those acting ‘in the name
of equality’ and a contingent police order which
‘presupposes their inequality’ (May, 2010: 73).
Space then, for Rancière, serves as both the
‘medium of fixity and change’ (Dikeç and
Swyngedouw, 2017: 14).
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2 Moving beyond the ontological dichotomy
Writing in acknowledgement of the work of the
late Neil Smith, Jones et al. (2017) recall a 2005
Association of American Geographers (AAG)
panel where participants, including Smith,
debated Marston et al.’s (2005) ‘Human Geo-
graphy without Scale’. Smith responded to the
claim that ‘scale is not an ontological category
of space’ (Jones et al., 2017: 147) by declaring,
‘I agree with you, but you still have to under-
stand that scale exists!’ (2017: 148) – a state-
ment that Jones et al. remark is ‘somewhat
contradictor[y]’ (Jones et al., 2017: 148). Jones
et al.’s (2017) comment here is worth recount-
ing as it exemplifies the ontological dichotomy
at play in the argument Marston et al. (2005)
advanced. The choice presented is between a
‘foundational’ concept of scale as an ‘ontologi-
cal given category’ (Marston et al., 2005: 419;
Jones et al., 2017: 148) or their proposed ‘anti-
foundationalist’ eradication of scale.
Instead, under a Rancierian approach, the
rejection of scale as an ontological category
and the acceptance of ‘already-existing’ scales
need not be seen as mutually exclusive posi-
tions. To the contrary, Rancière’s post-founda-
tionalist approach enables us to consider the
role of scale not as an ‘ontological category
of space’ (Jones et al., 2017: 147), but as part
of a socially-constructed police order – a nor-
malized way of relating to the world that is
inherited and contested (Dikeç, 2017). In his
conception of the police, Rancière seeks not
to essentialize any given social orders, but
merely to recognize them alongside their ‘lack
of foundation’ in ontology and ‘the sheer contin-
gency of any social order’ (Rancière, 1999: 16).
Rancière’s approach is post-foundational pre-
cisely because he recognizes that commonly-
held existing ideas which work to order society
(such as scale) can be quite rigid, and that as
they lack an ontological principle, they can
always be contested. Smith, writing of post-
foundationalism, has remarked:
However much we may want to emphasise fluid-
ity, if for no other reason than to open up political
possibilities [ . . . ] social relations [ . . . ] are not
infinitely fluid in any given time and place [and]
can be historically and geographically quite rigid.
They are fixed not in the sense of being unchange-
able, universal, or philosophical necessities, but
[ . . . ] certain kinds of social relations and interests
succeed in making themselves hegemonic. One
can therefore recognise quite ‘foundational’
social relationships, for any given society, time,
or place, while implying no ontological claims
whatsoever. To deny the historically and geogra-
phically contingent foundation of these social
relations is to deny politics. (2008a: 173)
Rancière offers an unexplored angle for
approaching ‘already-existing’ scale that moves
beyond the ontological dichotomy presented in
‘Human Geography without Scale’ (Marston
et al., 2005). Asserting that scale is part of a
police order indeed shares much with epistemo-
logical approaches in that it points to the role of
scale as a socially-constructed representational
or discursive device deployed to assert or con-
test scale (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). How-
ever, MacKinnon (2010: 22) has argued that
the focus on practice, and the discursive articu-
lation of scales, provides a ‘one-sided view’ of
the contingent ‘product and [ . . . ] progenitor’
relationship that I argue Rancière’s frame is
able to better capture. MacKinnon (2010) has
similarly argued that the charge of ontological
reification against those who assert that scales
predate social activity is overdrawn. As I will
elaborate in the subsequent section, Rancière’s
approach offers a way to think about how we
may indeed inherit ideas about scales that work
to order space without running this risk of onto-
logical reductionism.
However, Rancière’s approach is by no
means a panacea. As Leitner and Miller
(2007) have pointed out, there are limitations
to ontological debate. Moore’s (2008) com-
ments provide a useful example to this end in
suggesting that, despite his appreciation for the
Blakey 631
social construction and contingency of scale,
Smith cannot be absolved from ontological the-
orizing. Moore (2008) suggests Smith misun-
derstands ontology, citing Elden (2005), who
claims that ontology is about ‘how it all hangs
together’ (Searle, 1995: xi). But this is, of
course, entirely dependent on what one under-
stands ontology to be. As we have seen, for
Rancière, it is the utter lack of an ontological
principle that necessitates the contingent and
contestable socio-spatial orders that he calls the
police. So, whilst adopting a Rancièrian
approach cannot be considered a silver bullet,
it offers an unexplored angle that enables one to
consider contingent scalar imaginaries and their
lack of an ontological principle.
IV An aesthetic approach to scale
Whilst Rancière (1999) shares Marston et al.’s
(2005) concern for the political ramifications of
ontological reductionism, his solution is dis-
tinct. Instead, ‘aesthetics takes on a leading
role’ whilst ontological theorizing is abstained
from (Ieven, 2009: 60). Crucially, under this
aesthetic approach, we do not apprehend the
world in a ‘flat’ manner. We instead inherit a
‘common-sense’ way of ‘perceiving and mak-
ing sense of the world’, which Rancière terms
the police ‘distribution of the sensible’ (Dikeç,
2012a: 277). But what difference does it make
to insist that scale is part of this distribution of
the sensible rather than an ontological entity?
As Moore has suggested:
many terms [ . . . ] are deeply constitutive of the
common-sense ‘folk sociologies’ [ . . . ] by which
we make sense of the world. As such they tend to
be reified in social thought as essential and natural
entities, and these reified understandings are often
uncritically adopted by social scientists as cate-
gories of analysis. (Moore, 2008: 207)
Moore (2008: 208) asserts that ‘however con-
tingent and fluid’ we might argue scales to be,
‘once socially constructed they are treated as
every bit as real and fixed as ontological
givens’. But the master-stroke within Ran-
cière’s framework is that he keeps common-
sense ways of making sense of the world (the
police) and the potential for different ways to
make sense of the world (politics) in parallax
view. Rancière terms this approach a ‘method
of equality’ where, in considering the capacity
of each and all to bring about politics, he seeks
out ‘egalitarian articulations of an alternative
world within the world as it is’ (Davidson and
Iveson, 2014: 7). In other words, he is interested
in dis-sensus, a ‘division inserted in “common
sense”: a dispute over what is given and about
the frame within which we see something as
given’ (Rancière, 2010: 77). Politics, therefore,
brings about a redistribution of the sensible
(Tolia-Kelly, 2017), such that it ‘is aesthetic in
principle’ (Rancière, 1999: 58). As Derickson
(2018) argues, Rancière’s method of equality
compels us to reject understandings of spaces
as intrinsically political and compels us to
instead consider the political processes through
which spatial imaginaries (such as scale)
become denaturalized or indeed how this is
resisted. Considering scales through Rancière’s
aesthetic approach means that we can attend to
how scales are socially constructed, how shared
and pre-existing ideas about scales shape social
practice, and ultimately their fallibility in the
face of politics. But what does this look like in
practice?
1 Scales and supplements
Rancière’s explicit comments about scale are
few and far between. However, in a 2016 inter-
view in BibliObs he is asked if ‘a people’ neces-
sarily has to be national in scale (Rancière,
2016b). He first responds that a ‘people, in the
political sense, always constitutes itself as
something apart from the state form of the peo-
ple’ (Rancière, 2016b: np). One must note that,
for Rancière (1999: 22–3), the ‘people’ are
those that are effectively the surplus to the
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population recognizable within the police. They
are the possible subject of politics, those that
declare a wrong against the police and bring
about a redistribution of the sensible. Instead,
Rancière asserts that the national scale is ‘a col-
lective symbolisation and, like any symbolisa-
tion, it is the stakes of a permanent struggle’ by
the people (Rancière, 2016b: np). This is not to
say that the national scale ‘exists’ in a metaphy-
sical sense, but that, as the space of the police
and of politics are ‘enmeshed’, common-sense
ideas of the national scale often become the
stakes of political struggle (Dikeç, 2012b:
673). His allusion to the state is also of note
here, as one actor (though not the only actor)
that works to perpetuate common-sense sur-
rounding the national scale.
Nonetheless, as ‘the spaces of politics are
necessarily enmeshed with the space of the
police [ . . . ] there are a multiplicity of possible
spaces at different scales’ that can be politicized
(Bassett, 2014: 888). Rancière’s comments
about the ‘world police’ in the final pages of
Dis-agreement substantiate this further, where
he writes:
The reign of globalization is not the reign of the
universal [ . . . ] There is a world police [ . . . ] But
there is no world politics. The ‘world’ can get
bigger but the universal of politics does not get
any bigger. (1999: 139)
For Rancière the global scale is yet another
‘collective symbolisation’ that is not universal
or ontological precisely because it can be infi-
nitely transformed in acts of politics (see also
Rancière, 2016a: 157–9). However, what is
unclear here is if scales such as the national or
the global do form a ‘collective symbolisation’,
should one consider them as a police distribu-
tion of the sensible or as merely as an ordering
device within a distribution of the sensible? My
inclination is the latter.
It is useful to revisit Brenner’s (2001) distinc-
tion between singular and plural applications of
the politics of scale to understand why. In the
singular usage, ‘the politics of scale denotes the
production, reconfiguration or contestation of
some aspect of sociospatial organisation within
a relatively bounded geographical arena’ (2001:
599). Singular conceptions, therefore, observe
how a particular scale is sociohistorically con-
structed. In contrast, the plural usage of the term
denotes the ‘production, reconfiguration or con-
testation of particular differentiations, orderings
and hierarchies among geographical scales’
(2001: 600). In Agnew’s (1997) discussion of
political parties in Italy, for instance, he demon-
strates how policing outlooks are intrinsically
tied to their constructions of scale, such that ‘the
boundaries they draw [ . . . ] contingent as they
may be, define the geographical scales that
channel and limit their poli[cing] horizons’
(1997: 118). One might simply equate this
understanding with the distribution of the sen-
sible and how it ‘demarcate[s . . . ] the spaces of
the visible and the invisible, and articulates
these allocations of parties and parts’ (Rancière,
1999: 40). Such an understanding also implies a
multiplicity of coexisting police distributions of
the sensible. This is the understanding that
Davidson and Iveson (2015: 552) advance in
their reading of ‘the city’ through a Rancièrian
frame, remarking that it is ‘a naturalized police
order or “distribution of the sensible”’. How-
ever, this multiplicity is problematic if we dig
deeper into Rancière’s thinking.
Brenner has warned that this singular usage
of scale should be employed only ‘in question to
its embeddedness or positionality within a
broader scalar hierarchy’ (2001: 600, emphasis
original). Implicit in this singular usage of scale
is, therefore, an appreciation for the ‘outside’ of
any given scale. But yet, the police ‘is a partition
of the sensible whose principle is the absence of
a void and of a supplement’ (Rancière, 2001: 8).
In other words, because there is nothing that the
police leaves unaccounted for, there can be no
‘outside’ or remainder as everything is see-
mingly in its place (Rancière, 2010: 36). It is
for this reason that I suggest that scales can
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only be conceived of as part of this broader
aesthetic ordering. Moreover, this also implies
that there cannot be a multiplicity of police
distributions of the sensible. Consequently, I
shall argue that scales are part of this assign-
ment of place by the police. Sevilla-Buitrago
(2015: 99) has similarly remarked that the dis-
tribution of the sensible might entail ‘regimes
of scale and place that [shape ...] our social
being and forms of socialization’.
2 Scales and superimpositions
Let us return both to Rancière’s comments and
to an example to understand the implications of
this approach. He not only observes that scales,
such as ‘the national’ or ‘the global’, are often
the stakes of politics, but that ‘a people also
constitutes itself locally, in relation to a given
domination’ (Rancière, 2016b: np). In The
Method of Equality, for instance, Rancière
writes that NGOs may ‘fight the powers of the
world government’ but that they do so ‘on the
ground’ (2016a: 159). Rancière’s point is that
even though scales might be at stake, politics is
always rooted in local ‘fractures’ from which
‘egalitarian logic’ works to disrupt the police
(1999: 137). Rancière gives the example of the
Spanish Indignados who pitted themselves
against the national-scale logic of austerity
(Rancière, 2016b), a case well-rehearsed
amongst Rancièrian thinkers in Geography
(Bassett, 2014; Garcı́a-Lamarca, 2017;
Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2015).
The Indignados (‘the outraged’) are a self-
titled group of anti-austerity activists who, fol-
lowing the arrest of 24 demonstrators during a
protest against neo-liberal economic reforms on
15 May 2011, set up camp in Puerta del Sol
square in Madrid, Spain (Sevilla-Buitrago,
2015). As Sevilla-Buitrago (2015: 11) suggests,
in setting up camp the movement reappropriated
public space to create a ‘space of appearance’, a
space ‘from which a new democratising politi-
cal sequence may unfold’ (Swyngedouw, 2014:
174). This ‘space of appearance’ broke with the
given order of ‘where the voices of the people
could be expressed, what they could say and
how they could narrate and represent public
space’ (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015: 11).
In demanding their right to equality, Puerta
del Sol square became a ‘a polemical common
space’ (Dikeç, 2005: 178), a produced space
from which politics may – or may not – arise
(Davidson and Iveson, 2014: 137–152; Dikeç,
2005, 2016). This attempt to construct a ‘local’
space of appearance for the Indignados also
took place within the space of the police (Dikeç
and Swyngedouw, 2016). A polemical space,
therefore, is one where there are ‘two worlds
in one and the same world’, a space where ‘two
logics’ for making sense of the world meet
(Rancière, 1999: 32). On the one hand, there
was a national-scale logic in Spain which iden-
tified that the cost of the crisis ought to be borne
by the public (Bassett, 2014). On the other, the
demonstrators provided ‘localised inscriptions’
of a different logic, whereby the commodifica-
tion of public space and the pandering to the
financial markets is eradicated (Sevilla-
Buitrago, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2014: 171). In
this sense, Puerta del Sol square became a
polemical space precisely because it became
an aesthetic superimposition between this
national-scale logic and the local scene, staged
by the Indignados, which declares it as wrong
(Rancière, 2016b). Scale, here, provides the
spatialized language to consider how this
polemical space emerged on the ground. More-
over, the risk of ‘already-existing’ scales impos-
ing a ‘cordoned register for resistance’ (Marston
et al., 2005: 427) is mitigated by actively con-
sidering such moments of dissensus, where
common-sense surrounding scales are disrupted
through an alternative logic.
As we have noted, individual scales cannot
be taken in isolation. Swyngedouw (2014: 171)
remarks that Puerta del Sol square was an
‘embryonic’ politicization, inspiring similar
movements across Spain. Reminiscent of the
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scale-jumping chants of ‘Tompkins Square
Everywhere’ (Smith, 2010 [1984]), the Indigna-
dos claimed ‘[w]e’re here, but anyway its glo-
bal, and we’re everywhere’ (Swyngedouw,
2014: 182). Rancière similarly considers scale-
jumping tactics during the civil unrest that
spread through Paris in May 1968. Following
the expulsion of the movement’s leader, the
German-Jewish Daniel Cohn-Bendit, from
Paris in May 1968, Rancière notes how demon-
strators ‘declared, against all police evidence,
“We are all German Jews”’ (1999: 59). Be it
in claiming that ‘we are all German Jews’, that
the Indignados are ‘global’ or ‘Tompkins
Square Everywhere’, it is also clear that not only
are ideas about individual scales often the stakes
of political claims, but that claims are made
against a wider ‘gestalt of scale’ (Smith, 1987:
63) which is declared as ‘wrong’ (Rancière,
1999: 6). Moreover, in doing so, the qualities
of one scale (e.g. the polemical status of Puerta
del Sol square) can be utilized to inspire claims
to or around another (e.g. the Indignados being
global).
Finally, it is important to respond to the con-
cern amongst commentators that Rancière’s
thought, and post-foundational political thinking
more generally, leads to a diminished frame to
consider the political (Beveridge and Koch,
2017). What does an approach which reserves
the term politics for demands of equality mean
for scale theorists? As Dikeç (2017) has
responded to Beveridge and Koch’s (2017: 32)
claim that Rancière’s ‘restricted’ conceptualiza-
tion ‘reduces the realm of political action’, one
can instead argue the contrary – that this is an
expansionary frame. In insisting that anyone can
‘become a political subject and anything a polit-
ical issue’, Rancière’s frame is remarkedly open,
expanding our horizons for thinking about how
spatial orders are reconfigured (Dikeç, 2017: 52).
Equally, this does not stop us considering how
common-sense surrounding scales is trans-
formed through already-existing governance
mechanisms such as party politics. For this I lean
upon Marchart’s (2011) term ‘minimal politics’,
as a reordering of power within the possibilities
of what the police permits. Take, for instance, the
minimal politics of Brexit or the Scottish inde-
pendence movement as a neat example of this. It
is indeed important to hold on to a lexicon that
can describe how changes within a police order
occur, which nonetheless work to redefine our
common-sense surrounding scales.
V Conclusion: Scales, aesthetics
and a method of equality
I have argued that Rancière’s framework pro-
vides one way forward for human geography’s
scale debate. I have argued that the divides
amongst commentators often stem from their
position on how scale relates to ontology. Take,
for instance, those that consider scales as an
‘already partitioned geography’ (Smith, 1993:
101) and those that reject this as ontological
reification (MacKinnon, 2010; Moore, 2008).
These ontological divides are perhaps nowhere
more evident than in the debates that played out
subsequent to Marston et al.’s (2005) rejection
of scale and proposal of a ‘flat’ ontology in its
place.
Rancière’s aesthetic approach, however,
offers an alternative solution to this ‘problem of
ontological reductionism’ (Ieven, 2009: 60). I
have suggested that scales might be considered
as part of Rancière’s police ‘distribution of the
sensible’, ‘an established set of possible modes
of perception’ that shape conduct in particular
historical and geographic contexts (Tolia-Kelly,
2017: 127). In this vein, our common-sense ideas
about scale precede and shape social activity,
working to frame time and space in different
ways, along with what is seen as in and out of
place. However, as our ‘common-sense’ sur-
rounding scales lacks an ontological principle,
politics is always a possibility. Far from limiting
‘entry points into politics’, scale as a ‘vertical
imaginary’ can form the stakes of politics (Mar-
ston et al., 2005: 427, 420). It is vital, therefore,
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to recognize existing, commonly-held ideas
about scale to understand how they are sup-
planted (Leitner and Miller, 2007).
Whilst Rancièrian thinkers within Geogra-
phy have (often implicitly) utilized scale in
divergent ways, in this piece I have suggested
that it is important to consider any given scale
not in isolation but in relation to a wider distri-
bution of the sensible. In keeping scales and the
opportunity for their contestation in parallax
view, a Rancièrian approach can more fully
account for scale as a ‘product and a progenitor’
of social activity than epistemological
approaches (MacKinnon, 2010: 22). Moreover,
given that scales take the form of contingent,
shared understandings that are at once symbolic
with material manifestations (Dikeç, 2012b;
Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017), this approach
is able to bring together idealist approaches
which understand scales as ‘mental contri-
vances’ and materialist understandings of scales
as produced through political struggle (Herod,
2003: 21). Nonetheless, as Leitner and Miller
(2007) suggest, there are limitations to ontolo-
gical debate and this approach cannot be con-
sidered as a panacea.
It is also important not to neglect the intent of
the arguments at play. Those warning against
scale-theorizing as ‘ontological reification’
have done so out of a concern that our frames
of analysis foreclose the opportunity to consider
alternative configurations. This is indeed impor-
tant to consider and Rancière’s approach can
mediate this risk. As Davidson and Iveson
(2015) have argued, the full implications of
Rancière’s ‘method of equality’ have not been
attended to in human geography. His method
focuses attention on those moments when our
existing ideas about scales are disrupted through
politics (Iveson, 2015). The point here is that we
ought not only to consider common-sense on
what scales ‘exist’, but also those moments
when scales are contested (Davidson and Ive-
son, 2015). Indeed, whilst as Marston et al.
(2005: 420) rightly point out, we do not
encounter scales ‘“up there” in a vertical ima-
ginary, but on the ground, in practice’, this is not
to say that these shared, vertical imaginaries do
not matter. Under the Rancièrian method, the
task for scale theorists is to consider those
moments when common-sense on these vertical
imaginaries is met with dissensus ‘on the
ground’ (Rancière, 2016a: 159).
Finally, this paper poses broader challenges.
How, for instance, might other post-foundational
political thinkers or aesthetic thinkers infuse
understandings of scale? Moreover, the scale
debate’s impact extends beyond the concept
itself, with Marston et al.’s (2005) ‘flat’,
site-based ontology being part of a broader dis-
ciplinary shift towards relational approaches
(Anderson et al., 2012; Jones, 2010). But as
Gerhardt (2020) has warned, a focus on sites and
relations alone may lead to the oversight of those
forces that order them. Rancière’s aesthetic and
dissensual approach might also, therefore, be a
fruitful means to consider ‘common-sense’ con-
cepts that work to order space more generally
(such as territory, place, scale or combinations
thereupon) whilst avoiding the risks of ontologi-
cal reductionism and remaining sensitive to
emergent politics (Jessop et al., 2008; Leitner
et al., 2008; Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015).
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